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Public opinion research shows that American citizens utilize domain-specific political values to guide 
opinion formation in the key issue areas that comprise the American political agenda. One set of 
political values operates on economic welfare opinions, a different set of values applies to cultural 
issue positions, a third set shapes foreign policy preferences, and so on in other policy domains. 
Drawing on Shalom SchwartzÕs theory of basic human values, this paper argues that two socially 
focused valuesÐÐself-transcendence and conservationÐÐguide opinion formation across all major 
policy domains. By contrast, the personally-focused values of self-enhancement and openness-to-
change should play a more limited role in preference formation. These hypotheses are tested using 
data from a novel 2011 national survey and the 2012 General Social Survey. The statistical results 
affirm expectations. We show that self-transcendence and conservation values predict scores on 
symbolic ideology, economic conservatism, racial conservatism, cultural conservatism, civil liberties, 
and foreign policy opinions. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change values play a modest role in 
shaping preferences. 
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How do American voters decide where they stand on the issues of the day? Most voters do 
not hold crystallized attitudes on political controversies. Instead people construct positions from 
broader political predispositions. Foremost among these are domain-specific core values, which let 
people make fast and frugal decisions that comport with abstract political beliefs. In the economic 
welfare domain, beliefs about equality, humanitarianism, self-reliance, government, autonomy, 
capitalism, and democracy guide evaluations of issues such as aid to the poor, tax policy, and so on 
(Feldman and Zaller 1992; McClosky and Zaller 1984). For cultural issues such as abortion and gay 
rights, beliefs about authority, conformity, tradition, tolerance, religion, and equality carry weight 
(Layman 2001; McCann 1997). In foreign affairs, beliefs about warfare, ethnocentrism, patriotism, 
social intolerance, conformity, militant and cooperative internationalism, isolationism, and 
retributive justice shape opinion (Chittick et al. 1995; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 1990; Liberman 
2006). In short, at least 20 domain specific values are posited to drive opinion in the economic 
welfare, cultural issues and foreign policy domains.  
Note the paradox. The proliferation of core political values violates the premise on which 
these theories rest. The whole point of the enterprise is that Òa small number of general valuesÓ 
allow citizens to Òrespond to a large number of political issuesÓ (Sniderman et al. 1991: 270). Yet as 
our summation reveals, distinct sets of political values operate in different policy domains. If innate 
cognitive and motivational constraints foster reliance on a small number of domain specific values, 
how do unmotivated cognitive misers become so adept at applying so many values to so many issues 
across so many policy domains?  
To address this puzzle, we develop and test an elegant theory of value-based reasoning in the 
context of U.S. public opinion. Following the lead of scholars in the field of comparative political 
psychology (Beckers et al. 2012; Caprara et al. 2006; Datler et al. 2013; Piurko et al. 2011; Schwartz 
et al. 2010), we draw upon Shalom SchwartzÕs (1992, 1994) theory of basic human values to propose 
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that two crowning values shape opinion in the key issue areas that comprise the American political 
agenda. Human values function as transsituational guides that motivate attitude expression, 
judgment, and behavior in all walks of life. Given this flexibility, general human values seem a good 
bet to facilitate political decision making (Rokeach 1973). But, we argue, not all values are equally 
consequential for the derivation of political opinion. Self-transcendence values prioritize acceptance 
of and concern for other people, different groups, and the world at large. Conservation values 
emphasize deference to social convention, resistance to social change, and social stability. These 
inter-personal goals focus on how individuals relate to other people and to society writ large. As 
such, self-transcendence and conservation values should constrain opinions about the role 
government plays in the public life of the nation. By contrast, self-enhancement values elevate the 
pursuit of personal gain, success, and dominance at the expense of others, while openness-to-change 
values stress individual feeling, thought, action, and stimulation. These are egocentric concerns that 
emphasize what is best for the individual in her private life. Self-enhancement and openness-to-
change values have less clear cut implications about what is best for national life. Therefore, these 
orientations should play a smaller role in shaping opinion about the role of government in American 
public life. 
We test these hypotheses using data from a 2011 national survey we designed and the 2012 
General Social Survey (GSS). We find that the socially-oriented values of self-transcendence and 
conservation constrain opinions on economic issues, racial issues, cultural issues, civil liberties, 
foreign policy issues, and symbolic ideology. By contrast, the privately-oriented values of self-
enhancement and openness-to-change wield less influence over political preferences. Put simply, we 
do not need an ever-expanding array of domain specific values to explain public opinion within and 
across different issue areas. Instead, the positions people take on public policy are rooted in two 
bedrock human values that transcend politics.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Social scientists have devoted a great deal of attention to the values construct.1 To begin with 
the most widely accepted view in social psychology, Schwartz (1994: 20) builds on the classic work 
of Rokeach (1973) to define values as (1) abstract beliefs about (2) desirable end states or behaviors 
that (3) transcend specific situations, (4) guide evaluation and behavior, and are (5) ranked in terms 
of personal importance. Basic values reflect inter- and intra-personal goals. These goals are more 
abstract compared to political attitudes.  
The Schwartz perspective holds that clusters of values expressing similar goals reduce to 
higher-order value types (much like discrete personality traits reduce to the ÒBig 5Ó). To illustrate, 
the discrete values of Òrespect for religionÓ and ÒdevoutÓ, in conjunction with values such as 
ÒhumilityÓ and Òdetachment from worldly concernsÓ, are captured by the broader ÒtraditionÓ value 
type. When the structure underlying all discrete values is analyzed, 10 broader value types emerge: 
universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism, 
stimulation, and self-direction (Schwartz 1992). Each value type reflects an abstract goal that serves 
individual or social needs. Table 1 defines the 10 value types in terms of the goals they express. 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 arrays the 10 value types along a motivational circumplex whereby adjacent 
categories have more in common with one another than with value types at the opposite side of the 
circle. For instance, power values, which emphasize social standing and prestige, are compatible with 
achievement values that prize personal success and advancement. The power and achievement value 
types emphasize individual gains and rewards, which of necessity come at the expense of weaker 
individuals and groups in society. Contrariwise, the benevolence and universalism value types 
                                                
1 Our ÒTheoretical FrameworkÓ section draws heavily on Goren (2013: 161-168) and Rathbun et al. (2016: 126-
128). 
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emphasize care and concern for the well-being of others, be they in-group members in the case of 
benevolence or the broader society or even the world at large in the case of universalism. These 
value types share a common, pro-social desire to help others. 
When the broader goals that underlie all 10 value types are examined, four superordinate 
dimensions emerge: (1) self-transcendence values that foster acceptance of and concern for other 
individuals and groups (comprised of the universalism and benevolence value types); (2) 
conservation values that prioritize adherence to social convention, social stability, and resistance to 
social change (including the security, conformity and tradition value types); (3) self-enhancement 
values, which call for the pursuit of oneÕs self-interest, success, and dominance over others 
(including hedonism, achievement and power); and (4) openness-to-change values that elevate 
independent feeling, thought, and action above all else (comprised of self-direction, stimulation and 
hedonism) (Schwartz 1992, 1994). Note that self-transcendence and conservation values prioritize 
how the individual relates to the broader society. As such, this pair can be seen as inter-personal or 
socially-oriented goals. Self-enhancement and openness values prioritize what is best for the 
individual in her private life, and thus, can be seen as intra-personal or self-centered goals (Rokeach 
1973; Schwartz 2012). These four super-ordinate values serve as the key explanatory constructs in all 
that follows. 
An obvious question is whether basic human values differ from domain-specific political 
values in theoretically consequential ways. We argue that they do. The first difference lies in the 
degree to which the concepts are defined as explicit political orientations. This becomes clear when 
we compare the political science and social psychology conceptualizations. In political science 
McCann (1997: 565) equates core values with Òoverarching normative principles and belief 
assumptions about government, citizenship, and American society.Ó Goren (2001: 160-161) writes 
Ò[c]ore values are evaluative standards citizens use to judge alternative social and political 
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arrangements.Ó These definitions highlight beliefs about ÒgovernmentÓ, ÒcitizenshipÓ, and Òpolitical 
arrangementsÓ rather than personal goals and priorities that govern daily living as in the social 
psychological conceptualization. Put otherwise, political values are inherently political 
predispositions.  
To take two examples, people that endorse the value of limited government oppose 
government efforts to ensure that everyone has a job and a good standard of living (Feldman and 
Zaller 1992). Other research reveals that people who view war as immoral oppose the use of military 
force to settle international disputes (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987). None of this is terribly surprising. 
In each case the political value in question (i.e., limited government, morality of warfare) lies in close 
proximity to the policy opinion it purports to explain (i.e., government supported jobs, the use of 
military power). We do not mean to imply that political values and issues are the same: they are not. 
Instead, our point is that basic human values, which are defined as abstract inter- and intra-personal 
goals, lie further removed from issue opinions than political values do. 
The second key theoretical difference between basic human values and domain-specific 
political values is that political scientists typically isolate one or two values presumed to influence 
opinion in a narrowly defined issue area, and thus, neglect broader value systems. In their 
groundbreaking study of foreign policy opinion Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) identify ÒethnocentrismÓ 
and Òmorality of warÓ as core values that influence beliefs about national security. Likewise, 
FeldmanÕs seminal work (1988) examines how equal opportunity and economic individualism 
constrain social welfare opinion. If the purpose of the research is to provide a fine grained analysis 
of key factors shaping opinion in a single issue area, this approach makes sense. If the goal of the 
research is to examine how value systems shape public opinion across the key issue areas in American 
politics, the usual line of attack will not do. By taking a domain specific approach that privileges one 
or two values in a given policy domain, this strategy elides the broader question of how value 
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systems systematically affect opinion across policy domains (Feldman 2003). Our paper seeks to 
remedy to this oversight.  
Having defined basic human values and distinguished them from domain-specific political 
values, we now develop our theory of value-based reasoning by addressing three key questions that 
any such theory must consider. First, why should human values guide issue opinions? Second, which 
human values should structure opinion? Third, should some values matter more than others and, if 
so, why? To begin, basic human values are transsituational standards that motivate perception, 
judgment, and behavior in all walks of life. Substantial research shows that values influence lifestyle 
choices, consumer purchases, food preferences, social contact, academic interests, teamwork, 
organizational behavior, and so on (Fisher and Smith 2004; Homer and Kahle 1988; Maio and 
Olson 1995; Verplanken and Holland 2002). This is precisely how transsituational beliefs are 
supposed to function. The contrast here between human values and political values is instructive. It 
is hard to imagine how political beliefs about the morality of warfare or limited government might 
shape consumer purchases, academic interests, or food preferences. 
How do human values impinge upon political attitudes? We posit that values serve cognitive 
and motivational needs in a way that facilitates political judgment. In terms of cognitive functions, 
values are transsituational guides that let people make quick decisions on scores of political issues in 
a fairly (not perfectly) reliable manner. Rather than evaluating every piece of information that 
matters for a choice, people fall back on diagnostic cues that perform as acceptable substitutes for 
complete information. The rule of thumb is to deduce preferences on a specific issue consistent with 
the relevant values (Jacoby 2006; Sniderman et al. 1991). In this way, people can make reasonably 
accurate decisions without taxing their limited cognitive resources. 
In terms of motivational functions, values allow individuals to strike a balance between 
competing goals. People can achieve these goals through the attitudes they express, the choices they 
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make, and the behaviors they undertake in all domains of life. So far as politics is a symbolic domain 
centering on community and the country as a whole, the expression of human values through 
political opinions lets people signal what they view as important in public life (Schwartz 1994). Value 
expression also serves motivational needs such as identity maintenance and image enhancement 
(Roccas 2003). Value expression provides a means for people to declare to themselves and others 
what kind of person they take themselves to be. In short, human values serve important cognitive 
and motivational functions when expressed through political attitudes. 
This brings us to the question of which values matter for issue judgments. This is where the 
distinction between socially-centered values and self-centered values comes into play. Schwartz 
(2012: 13) argues that self-transcendence and conservation values regulate Òhow one relates socially 
to others and affects themÓ whereas openness to change and self-enhancement values regulate Òhow 
one expresses personal interests and characteristics.Ó A review of the value descriptions in Table 1 
indicates why this is a reasonable way to think about the deep motives underlying the broad value 
dimensions. For example, conformity and tradition values stress deference to and respect for 
external or socially constructed sources of authority such as culture or religion, whereas stimulation 
values prioritize excitement and novelty in oneÕs private life. To us, it seems clear that conformity 
and tradition values are anchored more firmly in concerns about social relations, while stimulation 
goals reflect private interests and pursuits.  
This distinction between socially and personally focused values matters politically because a 
significant body of research shows that people (1) construct issue positions based on perceptions 
about what is best for society rather than on what is best for them as individuals (e.g., Sears and 
Funk 1991) and (2) make electoral choices informed by their perceptions of the state of the national 
economy rather than the state of their personal finances (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet 1981).  
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Consider how most issues are framed. Political issues pose tradeoffs over what is best for 
large swaths of American societyÐÐoften the ÒAmerican peopleÓÐÐrather than what is best for the 
atomized individual. Domestic political debate centers on the role the federal government should 
play in national life. Should the government do more to help the poor? Cut taxes on the middle 
class? Let unpopular groups speak? On every issue the answer has implications for major segments 
of the American public. In foreign policy, discourse centers on how to safeguard national security 
and advance the national interest abroad. Are military armaments or the tools of statecraft better 
suited to serve American interests? Should the U.S. work through the UN or go it alone in 
international affairs? To answer questions like these, people will, we suspect, turn more readily to 
their beliefs about what is best for society than their beliefs about what is best for them as 
individuals. Put simply, given the sociotropic nature of political issues, values that prioritize socially-
focused goals should be expressed more readily through policy opinions than egocentric values that 
prioritize self-advancement and self-gratification. 
A clarification: we do not mean to imply that self-centered values are irrelevant. What 
government does often affects someoneÕs ability to obtain what she values in her private life, which 
in turn can motivate self-interested political choice. For instance, Campbell (2002) demonstrates that 
self-interest shapes the participatory behavior of low income seniors that depend heavily on Social 
Security. Given this, there are compelling theoretical grounds for positing that self-enhancement and 
openness values may shape public opinion on policy issues for some people under some conditions. 
While we are sympathetic to this general proposition, we suspect that the impact egocentric values 
have on opinion may not generalize to the public at large. By testing whether personally focused 
values shape public opinion in the entire sample, our approach cannot detect subsets of the 
electorate that rely more heavily on self-enhancement and openness values. We view this as a 
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promising avenue for future research once the baseline effects of human values have been 
established. 
To reiterate, the socially-focused values of self-transcendence and conservation should 
translate more readily into policy opinions than the egocentric values of self-enhancement and 
openness to change, because the former map more directly onto public debates about social and 
political life.  
HYPOTHESES 
We now predict how self-transcendence and conservation values shape public opinion 
across the key issue areas in American politics, starting with symbolic ideology, which reflects 
symbolic and ideational attachments to liberal or conservative labels. Given the distinctive symbols 
and ideas associated with each label (McClosky and Zaller 1984), we expect self-transcendence, 
which emphasizes equality and social justice, will be inversely related to symbolic conservatism (H1). 
Conservation values, which stress commitments to security, stability, conformity, and tradition, 
should motivate conservative self-categorization (H2).  
Moving on, we hypothesize that self-transcendence values undermine support for 
conservative economic policies such as limited government, lower taxes, and opposition to social 
welfare programs (H3). The self-transcendence dimension prioritizes understanding, protection, and 
concern for the interests and well-being of everyone. People can express these goals by endorsing 
government efforts to insulate vulnerable subsets of the public from the whims of the market. We 
further predict that conservation values facilitate support for economic conservatism (H4). Because 
idleness and dependency are seen as violations of American cultural norms, conformity and tradition 
values should motivate adoption of small government views consistent with this cultural ethos. 
Similarly, we expect both values to impact racial conservatism, by which we mean opposition to 
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government efforts to help racial minorities. That is, self-transcendence should inhibit racial 
conservatism (H5) while conservation heightens it (H6). 
We equate cultural conservatism with support for morally orthodox positions on 
controversies such as abortion, gay rights, school prayer, and the like. People solicitous of the needs 
and well-being of others should resist claims that government must impose a singular conception of 
morality on everyone; therefore, self-transcendence values should be negatively related to cultural 
conservatism (H7). Conservation values, which stress preservation of tradition and adherence to 
time-tested customs, can be expressed politically by taking orthodox positions on the 
aforementioned issues. Hence, conservation values should translate into right-wing positions on 
cultural issues (H8). Both values should influence support for civil liberties as well, which reflect the 
extent to which someone is willing to guarantee basic freedoms (e.g., the right to make a public 
speech) to politically controversial groups (e.g., radical Muslims). Self-transcendence should promote 
support for civil liberties (H9) while conservation undermines support (H10). 
Lastly, we examine hawk-dove issues, which we define in terms of favoring military power or 
the tools of diplomacy, and unilateralism, which denotes support for U.S. efforts to go it alone in the 
international arena. We expect self-transcendence to generate resistance to a militaristic foreign 
policy (H11) because this value implies an inclination toward peaceful coexistence with those who 
differ. We also anticipate that conservation values will augment support for a hawkish foreign policy 
(H12). Citizens committed to the preservation of social convention, order, and stability should find 
the prospect of American military power more reassuring than those who care less about 
conservation. Following these rationales, we think that foreign policy unilateralism will be negatively 
related to self-transcendence (H13) and positively related to conservation (H14).  
DATA AND MEASURES
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For the past three decades batteries of value items have been administered to hundreds of 
convenience samples and dozens of nationally representative surveys in Europe and elsewhere 
(Caprara et al. 2006; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Kuntz et al. 2015; Schwartz 1994). The same 
cannot be said for research conducted with nationally representative U.S. samples. Given the lack of 
secondary data, we devised a survey and commissioned YouGov to administer it online to 1,200 
voting age adults in the continental U.S. during February 2011. Serendipitously, the GSS included a 
Schwartz valuesÕ battery on the merged cross-section and panel component of the 2012 survey, 
which gives us a chance to see if we can replicate our YouGov results.  
We rely on 19 items to construct multiple-indicator measures of self-transcendence, 
conservation, self-enhancement, and openness values in both surveys. The items cover 9 of the 10 
value types listed in Table 1.2 For each item respondents read about an abstract goal described as 
important to a hypothetical person and then indicated how similar he or she was to that person. To 
take an example from our YouGov survey, we measured self-transcendence values with four 
statements: (1) ÒShe thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. 
She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in lifeÓ; (2) ÒShe wants everyone to be treated 
justly, even people she doesnÕt know. It is important to protect the weak in societyÓ; (3) ÒIt is 
important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote herself to people close to herÓ; and 
(4) ÒIt is important to her to respond to the needs of others. She tries to support those she knows.Ó 
The response options are Òvery much like meÓ, Òlike meÓ, Òsomewhat like meÓ, Òa little like meÓ, 
Ònot like meÓ, and Ònot like me at all.Ó We used standard Schwartz items to tap conservation, self-
enhancement, and openness-to-change values (see online appendices A1 and A2 for question 
                                                
2 We drop the hedonism value type because it lies in both the self-enhancement and openness-to-change 
domains (Schwartz 1992). 
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wording and descriptions of the YouGov and GSS samples).  In what follows, we recode all 
Schwartz value measures from their given metrics to a new 0-1 scale. 
Several features of the items deserve emphasis. First, every statement portrays another 
personÕs goals in a way that evokes a value implicitly rather than asking about it directly. Doing so 
minimizes social desirability pressures; reflects the types of interpersonal comparisons individuals 
make in their daily lives; and avoids asking respondents to think about what is important to them, 
something they have less experience with than person-to-person comparisons (Davidov et al. 2008; 
Schwartz 2012).  
Second, question wording does not allude to government action or public policy. As 
statements about personally focused or socially focused goals, the Schwartz items stand farther 
removed from politics than the measures typically used to tap core political values. Consider this 
standard NES egalitarianism item: ÒWe have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country.Ó 
Some respondents may interpret the phrase Òequal rightsÓ to mean civil rights for African 
Americans or marriage equality for same sex couples. If this equality item inadvertently taps support 
for federal efforts to ensure equal rights for blacks or legalize gay marriage, any correlation between 
it and preferences on these issues will be artificially inflated. Similar problems compromise other 
measures in other surveys. Take this GSS equality item: ÒIt is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.Ó 
Because the question blends abstract ideas about equality with government policy, a finding that it 
predicts support for aid to the poor is not a powerful demonstration that egalitarianism influences 
policy opinion.  
Third, for nearly 30 years Schwartz and other value researchers have collected data from 
hundreds of independent samples in scores of countries. The posited values model has been 
confirmed empirically in repeated tests. That is, researchers often (but far from always) find that the 
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empirical patterns in the data fit the hypothesized value structure reasonably well (Davidov et al. 
2008; Schwartz 1992; Spini 2003). Given the large number of independent samples and the fact that 
they are from diverse cultures, linguistic traditions, age groupings, probability and non-probability 
samples, and different points in time, it seems reasonable to conclude that this model of value 
content and structures rests on a powerful empirical foundation. To conclude, the Schwartz items 
are more abstract than political value measures, and thus, less vulnerable to the criticism that they 
are too close semantically to the dependent variables they are supposed to explain.  
We turn now to the dependent variable measures. First, the seven-point liberal-conservative 
scale serves as our indicator of symbolic ideology. Second, we capture economic issues with items 
about government spending on multiple social welfare programs, the size and scope of government, 
federal responsibility for economic security, and so on (the Cronbach   reliability coefficient equals 
.80 in our YouGov survey and .73 in the GSS). For racial issues we use questions about government 
efforts to combat illegal immigration in our YouGov survey (single item) and about federal spending 
on blacks, federal aid to blacks, affirmative action, and related items in the GSS (  = .72). Fourth, 
we assess opinion on cultural issues via queries on abortion, gay rights, pornography laws and similar 
items (YouGov   = .72; GSS   = .71). Fifth, for civil liberties we use the standard GSS battery that 
asks respondents whether controversial groups such as atheists, racists, communists, and radical 
Muslims should be allowed to give a public speech, teach college students, and have a book in a 
public library (  =.79). To get at hawk-dove issues we rely upon items about the relative merits and 
demerits of hard versus soft power and military spending (YouGov   = .66; GSS single item). 
Seventh, we use a single item on working with the UN to gauge unilateralism in our YouGov poll. 
All dependent variables have been rescaled from the original metrics to lie on a 0-1 range and are 
keyed so that higher scores denote conservative responses. 
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Following Kinder and Sanders (1996) and Barker and Tinnick (2006), we control for party id 
(measured using the standard seven-point scale with higher scores denoting GOP ties, recoded to a 
0-1 range); black (1 = black, 0 other); Hispanic (1 = Latino/Latina, 0 other); female (1 = female, 0 = 
male); age (measured in years); education (1 = college graduate, 0 = other); and an income dummy 
(1 = high income, 0 = other income). We expect age and (GOP) partisanship to predict symbolic 
and policy conservatism; Black, Hispanic, and female to inhibit conservatism (excepting Black and 
Hispanic for cultural issues); education to covary positively with economic and racial conservatism, 
and negatively with cultural conservatism, civil liberties, and foreign policy preferences; and, lastly, 
higher income to predict symbolic and economic conservatism.  
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
The Measurement of Basic Human Values 
To begin, we use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test whether the four-dimensional 
model posited above fits the data. Because the observed items are ordinal-level measures, we use the 
robust weighted least-squares estimator implemented in MPlus 6. Table 2 reports the standardized 
factor loadings and global fit statistics for our YouGov data. Table 3 does the same for the GSS.3  
 [Table 2 and 3 about here]  
We start with the YouGov estimates in Table 2. The key results confirm our expectations. 
Note first that the item-factor correlations range from .53 to .84 with a mean correlation of .66, 
which suggests that the items measure the values they are supposed to measure. Second, the global 
fit measures indicate that the four-factor model does a very good job reproducing the observed 
covariance matrix. To be sure, the robust weighted least-squares χ2 is statistically significant. 
                                                
3 The models also contain correlated measurement errors that pick up method factor covariance. To preserve 
space, we do not report these estimates in the tables. 
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However, the CFI (comparative fit index) and RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) 
indicate good fit according to conventional standards. 
Moving on to Table 3, we find that the four-factor model fits the GSS data nearly as well. 
The item-factor correlations are solid, albeit a tad lower (mean loading = .57), and the CFI and 
RMSEA meet the conventional standards for good fit. Finally, note that we tested some rival two-
factor and one-factor models to see if a more parsimonious specification fit the data better. In every 
case model fit worsened relative to our four-factor specification (see appendices B1-B3). To sum up, 
the estimates support the four-factor model of value structure. In light of this, we create a simple 
additive scale for each dimension using the items that loaded on each factor. The Cronbach   
reliability coefficient varies from .67 to .84 in the YouGov sample and from .62 to .73 in the GSS.  
Statistical and Substantive Results 
 We focus on the Schwartz value dimensions and set aside the controls in what follows. 
Recall that we recoded all variables from their original metrics to lie on a 0-1 scale, with higher 
scores indicating greater importance attached to a value. We predict that the socially focused values 
of self-transcendence and conservation will affect symbolic ideology and public opinion in the 
economic welfare, racial, cultural, civil liberties, and foreign policy domains. Given the coding of the 
variables, self-transcendence should be inversely related to all dependent variables, conservation 
positively related. Self-enhancement and openness to change may also correlate with opinion, but 
because their focus is egocentric rather than sociotropic we think the relationships will be weaker 
than the corresponding relationships with socially-focused values. 
The YovGov ordinary least squares (OLS) unstandardized and standardized parameter 
estimates appear in Table 4. Table 5 assesses the substantive magnitude by simulating policy opinion 
for respondents at the 5th and 95th percentile on each human value in the YouGov data. Table 6 
reports the OLS estimates for the 2012 GSS data and Table 7 follows up with the predicted scores. 
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To preserve space, we report only the regression coefficients and predicted scores for the four value 
dimensions (the full set of estimates appear in appendix C1 for our YouGov data and appendix C2 
for the GSS data). To make it easier to read the results, statistically significant effects (p < .05, two-
tailed) are shaded in Tables 4-7. For example, by reading across the first row in Table 4 one can see 
that self-transcendence reaches significance across all six models.  
[Tables 4-7 about here] 
To start with symbolic ideology, bedrock social values predict symbolic conservatism in both 
samples. Self-transcendence values render individuals more likely to place themselves in the liberal 
end of the left-right continuum in 2011 (Table 4, column 2 t = -6.63) and 2012 (Table 6, column 2 t 
= -3.10). Conservation values exhibit the opposite effect. Respondents that rate conformity, security, 
and tradition values as highly important adopt more conservative self-identities than subjects who 
rate these values as less important (Table 4 t = 9.02; Table 6 t = 6.84). To convey the substantive 
significance of the results, Table 5 shows that respondents at the 95th percentile on self-
transcendence are 16 percent less symbolically conservative than respondents at the 5th percentile in 
the YouGov sample, ceteris paribus. The first difference in the GSS sample equals 9 percent (see Table 
7, column 2). Similarly, across both samples those who prioritize conservation are 21-23 percent 
more symbolically conservative than those who do not.  
For symbolic ideology, neither self-enhancement nor openness to change reaches 
conventional levels of significance in the YouGov sample (see Table 4, column 2). In the GSS the 
self-enhancement coefficient is negative and significant (Table 6, column 2 t = -2.87), indicating that 
those who prioritize self-enhancement find the conservative label less appealing than respondents 
who de-emphasize personal enhancement. However, openness to change falls well short of 
significance in the GSS.  
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We now take up the economic welfare estimates. First, the more importance one places on 
transcending parochial concerns to aid others, the lower the score on economic conservatism (2011 t 
= -9.53; 2012 t = -2.94). Speaking practically, we find that going from the 5th to the 95th percentile on 
self-transcendence predicts 10-20 percent declines in economic conservatism (Tables 5 and 7). Next, 
Table 4 reveals that persons who prioritize conservation values are more likely to adopt right-wing 
economic views (t = 4.04). Here, movement from low to high value importance corresponds to a 
simulated 9 percent increase in economic conservatism (Table 5). However, our hypothesis is not 
borne out by the GSS data in Table 6 (t = -0.29). Also contrary to expectations, we find that 
openness to change covaries with economic conservatism (Table 4 t = 2.01, p < .05; Table 6 t = 
1.96, p < .06). Yet the simulated impact proves modest at 4-6 percent (see Tables 5 and 7). Lastly, 
self-enhancement values make no difference in either sample.  
When it comes to racial conservatism, self-transcendence renders voters less conservative 
statistically (Table 4 t = -4.53, Table 6 t = -2.14) and substantively by 14 percent in 2011 (Table 5) 
and 8 percent in 2012 (Table 7). Conservation values prove significant as well (Table 4 t = 6.55 and 
Table 6 t = 3.97) and exhibit large simulated differences on racial conservatism (YouGov 24 percent; 
GSS: 16 percent). Self-enhancement and openness-to-change values matter little (all non-significant). 
Turning to cultural issues, self-transcendence (Table 4 t = -7.36) and conservation (t = 13.24) 
predict policy views in the YouGov study. Per Table 5, movement up the self-transcendence scale 
produces a 19 percent shift away from cultural conservatism. Comparable movement along the 
conservation scales produces a 37 percent rise in cultural conservatism. The 2012 GSS data yields no 
evidence of a systematic self-transcendence effect (Table 6 t = 0.36) but a sizeable effect for 
conservation values (t = 4.39). The predicted values reported in Table 7 show that movement from 
the 5th to the 95th percentile on conservation leads to 26 percent rise in cultural conservatism. 
Openness values appear to be independent of cultural conservatism in the YouGov data (t = 0.13) 
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but not the GSS data (t = -2.45). The Table 7 estimates reveal that movement up the openness scale 
is associated with 13 percent less conservatism on culture war issues. No evidence indicates that self-
enhancement values impact these issues in either sample.  
The 2012 GSS data let us tests whether basic human values covary with support for civil 
liberties for unpopular groups (e.g., atheists, racists, etc). Table 6 shows that conservation values 
matter a lot (t = 5.55). As Table 7 reveals, movement from the 5th to the 95th percentile renders 
respondents 30 percent less tolerant. Self-transcendence values matter as well (t = -1.96). Strong 
supporters of self-transcendence values score 10 percent more tolerant than tepid supporters. 
However, neither openness nor self-enhancement matter. Once again, the role of values is confined 
to the socially-oriented dimensions of conservation and self-transcendence.  
Moving on to hawk-dove issues, we find that self-transcendence (t = -8.42 in Table 4 and t = 
-2.67 in Table 6) and conservation (t = 7.09 and t = 3.90) predict opinion. Self-transcendence values 
render citizens less hawkish, while conservation values are associated with greater belligerence. The 
simulated substantive effects average about 16 percent for self-transcendence and 19 percent for 
conservation across the surveys. Self-enhancement leaves voters somewhat more inclined to endorse 
the use of military force (t = 2.19) in the YouGov survey but not in the GSS. Similarly, openness 
values positively affect hawk-dove issues in the former sample but not the latter. While significant, 
the 2011 effects of self-enhancement and openness on hawk-dove positions are modest at about 6 
percent, far smaller than the 16-19 percent effect sizes for self-transcendence and conservation 
values.  
We conclude with the foreign policy unilateralism item in our YouGov survey. Similar to the 
hawk-dove results, self-transcendence values are inversely related to unilateralism (t = -5.92). 
Respondents that prioritize moving beyond the self in their everyday lives score 17 percent lower on 
unilateralism than their counterparts who place less stock in this cognitive goal. Conservation values 
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render citizens more favorably disposed to American unilateralism in international politics (t = 4.10). 
Substantively, this translates into a 14 percent opinion difference. In line with expectations, the self-
centered values do not reliably predict unilateralism. 
To tally up the results, the estimates generally corroborate our theory of human values and 
public opinion. As anticipated, the socially-focused dimensions of self-transcendence and 
conservation predict opinion on symbolic ideology, economic welfare issues, racial issues, cultural 
issues, civil liberties, and foreign policy. Scanning across the shaded entries in Tables 4 and 6, we see 
that self-transcendence values prove significant in 11 of 12 models. From Tables 5 and 7 we 
calculate that respondents who rate self-transcendence as highly important (95th percentile) score 13 
percent more liberal on political opinion versus respondents who attach far less importance to these 
values (5th percentile). Conservation values also manifest robust predictive effects. Statistically, 
conservation values are significant in 11 of 12 equations. Substantively, people who prioritize 
conservation in their day-to-day lives score 20 percent higher on average on symbolic and policy 
conservatism as against respondents who do not prioritize conservation.  
The personally focused dimensions of self-enhancement and openness-to-change prove less 
relevant to judgments about what is best for the collective polity. The openness variable reaches 
significance in three models while falling short in the remaining nine. Self-enhancement reaches 
significance in only two of 12 models. Moreover, the substantive effects for these values prove 
trivial. In short, when it comes to public opinion, self-transcendence and conservation values matter 
a great deal, self-enhancement and openness values matter less (see appendix D for a series of tests 
which show that the weak performance of the personally-focused values is not due to excessive 
multicollinearity).  
Qualifications 
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For the most part the evidence affirms our value-based model of political judgment, but we 
need to qualify these preliminary results on a number of points. First, we have presumed that values 
shape opinion for most people. Given that well educated and politically sophisticated respondents 
are more adept at linking liberal-conservative orientations to policy opinions then their less educated 
and less sophisticated counterparts (Sniderman et al. 1991), one might posit that sophistication-
related variables moderate the relationship between values and policy opinions. To assess the 
robustness of our results we re-estimated the models for college graduates and people without a 
college degree. As indicated in appendices E1 and E2, self-transcendence and conservation manifest 
statistically significant effects on many dependent variables for low and high education people in our 
YouGov sample and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in our GSS sample. We note further that, 
consistent with the sophistication interaction model of opinion, the substantive effects of values on 
opinion are sometimes stronger among the college educated. Nevertheless, the takeaway point is 
that the value effects generally hold for both groups. 
Second, readers may note that a handful of the Schwartz items resemble other items that 
appear on national omnibus surveys. For instance, the Schwartz self-transcendence/equality item 
mimics two of the six NES egalitarianism items known to predict political opinion (e.g., Feldman 
1988).4 Given this, a critic might wonder if the egalitarianism item in the self-transcendence scale 
drives the results reported above. We can test this as follows. The GSS contains three measures of 
the universalism dimension of self-transcendence. When we drop the equality item and re-estimate 
the models in Table 6, self-transcendence remains significant in four of the six models and 
                                                
4 The Schwartz item reads: ÒShe thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. 
She believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.Ó The NES items read: Ò(1) ÒOur society should do 
whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.Ó (2) ÒIf people were treated more 
equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems.Ó 
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approaches significance in a fifth (see appendix F). The effect size drops in these models, but this is 
neither surprising nor damaging to our cause because removal of the equality item from the self-
transcendence scale degrades the measureÕs reliability and validity. The takeaway point is that the 
self-transcendence results are not driven by an item that has been widely deployed in prior research.5 
Third, readers may wonder whether the predictive effect of the Schwartz conservation values 
diminishes or vanishes when we control for the child-rearing values that scholars use to tap 
authoritarianism (Barker and Tinnick 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Such a result would call 
into question the novelty of our contribution. Once again, the GSS data permit such a test. We 
constructed a measure of authoritarianism using a pair of items that asked respondents to rank how 
important it is for children to learn to obey and to think for themselves to prepare them for life.6 We 
subtracted the Òthink forÓ score from the ÒobeyÓ score to construct an 8-point authoritarianism 
scale, keyed so higher scores correspond to increasing authoritarianism. We then added this variable 
to the models in Table 6 to see whether the conservation effects held. They did. As indicated in 
appendix G, the conservation effect does not change when compared to our results in Table 6. Note 
finally that our key results hold when we add symbolic ideology as a predictor to the policy opinion 
models (see appendices H1-H2). In conjunction, these robustness checks reinforce our claim that 
basic human values play an important role in shaping public opinion in the contemporary United 
States.    
                                                
5 We did not replicate this check for the YouGov data because we have only two universalism items versus the 
three available in the GSS survey. As such, the measurement cost in scale reliability and validity would, in our estimation, 
be too steep. 
6 Question wording: ÒIf you had to choose, which thing on this list would you pick as the most important for a 
child to learn to prepare him or her for life?Ó We used the (1) ÒTo ObeyÓ and the (2) ÒTo think for himself or herselfÓ 
items. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS  
Political scientists have searched for evidence that Americans ground their issue preferences 
in abstract beliefs about virtue and the good society. Scholars have followed two main approaches in 
this pursuit, the first centered on liberal-conservative principles, the second focused on political 
values. The liberal-conservative continuum helps explain how a sophisticated subset of the public 
evaluates issues, but it cannot explain what the less sophisticated bulk of the public does (Feldman 
2003). Domain specific theories itemize an extensive list of political values that guide opinion 
construction across policy domains, and thus seem to offer a solution to the puzzle of how people 
innocent of ideology reason about issues. But in so doing, this approach constructs a paradox from 
which it cannot escape. This approach has identified over 20 distinct ÒcoreÓ values that impact issue 
positions within multiple domains that would seem to tax the very cognitive and motivational 
constraints values are supposed to overcome. 
To solve this conundrum we have followed the lead of psychologists who have applied the 
Schwartz framework to the study of political behavior in a variety of non-U.S. contexts (Caprara et 
al. 2006; Davidov et al. 2008; Piurko et al. 2011; Schwartz et al. 2010). Consistent with some of these 
works, we have shown that self-transcendence and conservation values shape opinion broadly 
construed. First, the more importance people attach to transcending self-interest on behalf of others, 
the stronger their preferences for the liberal label, a generous welfare state, ameliorative racial 
policies, cultural progressivism, political tolerance, and dovish foreign policy. Second, the more 
individuals prioritize respect for tradition, deference to convention, and social order, the stronger 
their preferences for the conservative label, smaller government, racial self-help, culturally 
conservative policies, political intolerance, military power, and foreign policy unilateralism. Third, 
the egocentric values of self-enhancement and openness to change play a small role in generating 
support for or opposition to ideological labels or policy positions.   
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We believe our application of the Schwartz model provides a more plausible and 
parsimonious account of public opinion than the domain specific values framework. By placing two 
overarching human values at the center of mass belief systems, we overcome the problem of the 
never-ending proliferation of core political values. And by positing that self-transcendence and 
conservation guide opinion formation across the leading issue areas in American politics, we 
dispense with the need for separate domain specific theories of opinion that apply to each and every 
policy domain. In sum, the marriage of SchwartzÕs model of basic human values to the study of U.S. 
public opinion provides an elegant solution to the problem of how citizens deduce their preferences 
on major issues. 
To conclude, social scientists have long seen basic values as prime candidates for shaping 
public opinion on key issues. Our paper confirms that basic human values drive opinion formation, 
but with the critical qualification that not all values are consequential. Self-transcendence and 
conservation values stand apart from self-enhancement and openness-to-change values as drivers of 
public opinion. Public opinion in the United States depends on beliefs about the good and just 
society to a much greater extent than beliefs about the virtue of private gain.  
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Table 1: Schwartz Value Types  
 
1. Universalism values Ð understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the well-
being of everyone and nature  
 
2. Benevolence values Ð preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in 
frequent personal contact 
 
3. Conformity values Ð restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses that are likely to upset or 
harm others and break social expectations or norms  
 
4. Tradition values Ð respect for, commitment to, and acceptance of the customs and ideas 
embodied by oneÕs culture or religious standards  
 
5. Security values Ð safety, harmony, and stability of the self, personal relationships, and society  
 
6. Power values Ð social status and prestige, control of or dominance over people and 
resources 
 
7. Achievements values Ð personal success acquired by demonstrating competence according 
to social standards 
 
8. Hedonism values Ð pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself 
 
9. Stimulation values Ð excitement, novelty, and challenges in life 
 
10. Self-direction values Ð independent thought and action, choosing creating, exploring  
  
 Source: Adapted from Schwartz (1994: 22). 
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Table 2: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Basic Human Values, 2011 YouGov 
         Self- 
transcendence 
 
Conservation  
Self- 
enhancement 
Openness-to-
change  
 1 Universalism 1 .57    
 
2
 Universalism 2 .56    
 3 Benevolence 1 .78    
 4 Benevolence 2 .78    
 
5
 Security 1  .59   
 
6
 Security 2  .71   
 
7
 Conformity 1  .61   
 
8
 Conformity 2  .84   
 
9
 Tradition 1  .53   
 
10
 Tradition 2  .64   
 11 Achievement 1   .84  
 12 Achievement 2   .80  
 13 Achievement 3   .80  
 14 Power 1   .59  
 15 Power 2   .61  
 16 Self-direction 1    .53 
 
17
 Self-direction 2    .59 
 
18
 Stimulation 1    .57 
 
19
 Stimulation 2    .61 
     
CronbachÕs   .77 .77 .84 .67 
     
Model fit:     
  Robust WLS χ2  729.13   
  Degrees of freedom  125   
  p-value  < .01   
  CFI   .95   
  RMSEA  .06   
     
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. Standardized loadings reported. All loadings are significant at p < .01. WLS = 
weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.  
Number of observations = 1199. 
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Table 3: Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Basic Human Values, 2012 GSS 
         
 Self- 
transcendence 
 
Conservation 
Self- 
enhancement 
Openness-to-
change 
 1 Universalism 1 .51    
 
2
 Universalism 2 .60    
 
3
 Universalism 3 .44    
 4 Benevolence 1 .71    
 5 Benevolence 2 .63    
 6 Security 1  .59   
 7 Security 2  .73   
 8 Conformity 1  .48   
 9 Conformity 2  .59   
 
10 
Tradition 1   .61   
 
11
 Tradition  2  .46   
 
12
 Achievement 1   .74  
 
13
 Achievement 2   .78  
 
14
 Power 1   .19  
 
15
 Power 2   .54  
 
16
 Self-direction 1    .45 
 
17
 Self-direction 2    .65 
 
18
 Stimulation 1    .68 
 
19
 Stimulation 2    .40 
     
CronbachÕs   .65 .73 .70 .62 
     
Model fit:     
  Robust WLS χ2  443.23   
  Degrees of freedom  123   
  p-value  < .01   
  CFI   .95   
  RMSEA  .05   
     
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. Standardized loadings reported. All loadings are significant at p < .01. WLS = 
weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.  
Number of observations = 1289. 
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Appendix A1: Question Wording for Basic Human Values and Dependent Variables 
 
YouGov Data (2011) 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Symbolic conservatism (rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more conservative 
preferences): Here is a seven point scale on which the political views that people might hold are 
arranged from very liberal to very conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? 
ɿ Very liberal 
ɿ Liberal 
ɿ Slightly liberal 
ɿ Moderate, middle of the road 
ɿ Slightly conservative  
ɿ Conservative 
ɿ Very conservative  
 
Economic issues (alpha = .80, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences) 
a. /LPLWHGJRYHUQPHQW´:HQHHGDVWURQJJRYHUQPHQWWRKDQGOHWRGD\·VHFRQRPLF
SUREOHPVµ6HYHQSRLQW/LNHUWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP´6WURQJO\DJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\
disagree (1). 
b. Health care: 6 point scale with endpoLQWV´+HDOWKFDUHLVDULJKWDQGVKRXOGEHSURYLGHGWR
DOOFLWL]HQVUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHLUDELOLW\WRSD\µDQG´+HDOWKFDUHVKRXOGEHDSULYLOHJHIRU
WKRVHZKRFDQSD\IRULWµ 
c. ,QFRPHLQHTXDOLW\SRLQWVFDOHZLWKHQGSRLQWV´7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGJHWout of the 
EXVLQHVVRIWU\LQJWRSURPRWHLQFRPHHTXDOLW\µDQG´7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGGRPRUH
WRUHGXFHLQFRPHLQHTXDOLW\µ 
d. *RYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQSRLQWVFDOHZLWKHQGSRLQWV´*RYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQVXQIDLUO\
KXUWEXVLQHVVµDQG´*RYHUQPHQWUHJXODWLRQVSURWHFWVRFLHW\µ 
e. :HOIDUHVSHQGLQJ´If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of 
the following programs would you like to see spending DECREASED and for which 
would you like to see spending INCREASED? How about federal spending on people on 
ZHOIDUHµ)LYHSRLQWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP´,QFUHDVHGDORWµWR´'HFUHDVHGDORWµ 
 
Cultural issues (alpha = .72, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences) 
a. Moral traditionalism ´Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs and 
VH[XDOSUHIHUHQFHHYHQLILWPDNHVWKHPGLIIHUHQWIURPHYHU\RQHHOVHµSeven point Likert 
VFDOHUDQJLQJIURP´6WURQJO\DJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
b. 0RUDOWUDGLWLRQDOLVP´New OLIHVW\OHVDUHFRQWULEXWLQJWRWKHEUHDNGRZQRIRXUVRFLHW\µ
6HYHQSRLQW/LNHUWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP´6WURQJO\DJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
c. *D\PDUULDJHSRLQWVFDOHZLWKHQGSRLQWV´Recognize marriage only as a union between a 
PDQDQGDZRPDQµDQG´5HFRJQL]HPDUULDJHEHWZHHQJD\DQGOHVELDQFRXSOHVµ 
d. Marijuana legalization: SRLQWVFDOHZLWKHQGSRLQWV´.HHSPDULMXDQDLOOHJDODVLWLVWRGD\µ
DQG´/HJDOL]HPDULMXDQDµ 
 
Racial issues (single item rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more conservative 
preferences)  
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a. ,PPLJUDWLRQSRLQWVFDOHZLWKHQGSRLQWV´ 7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGJHWRXWRIWKHEXVLQHVV
RIWU\LQJWRSURPRWHLQFRPHHTXDOLW\µDQG´7KHJRYHUQPHQWVKRXOGdo more to reduce 
LQFRPHLQHTXDOLW\µ 
 
Security issues (alpha = .72, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
hawkish/conservative preferences)  
a. Flexible vs. Tough´6RPHSHRSOHWKLQNWKDWLQGHDOLQJZLWKRWKHUQDWLRQVRXUJRYHUQPHQW
should be strong and tough. Suppose these people are at one end of this scale ² at point 
number 1. Others think that our government should be understanding and flexible. 
Suppose these people are at the other end ² at point 7. And, of course, other people have 
opinions somewhere in between at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself 
RQWKLVVFDOH"µ  
b. 'LSORPDF\YV)RUFH´6RPHSHRSOHEHOLHYHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKRXOGVROYHLQternational 
problems by using diplomacy and other forms of international pressure and use military 
force only if absolutely necessary. Suppose we put such people at "1" on this scale. Others 
believe diplomacy and pressure often fail and the US must be ready to use military force. 
6XSSRVHZHSXWWKHPDWQXPEHU:KHUHZRXOG\RXSODFH\RXUVHOIRQWKLVVFDOH"µ 
c. )RUHLJQSROLF\UHVWUDLQW´The United States should take all steps including the use of force 
WRSUHYHQWDJJUHVVLRQE\DQ\H[SDQVLRQLVWSRZHUµ(7 point Likert scale ranging from 
´6WURQJO\DJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
d. )RUFHFDXVHVSUREOHPV´ 7KHXVHRUWKUHDWRIIRUFHVRPHWLPHVFUHDWHVPRUHSUREOHPVWKDQ
LWVROYHVE\FUHDWLQJKRVWLOLW\RUIHDURQWKHSDUWRIWKHRSSRVLQJVLGHµSRLQW/LNHUWVFDOH
ranJLQJIURP´6WURQJO\DJUHHµWR´6WURQJO\GLVDJUHH 
e. 'HIHQVHVSHQGLQJ´ If you had a say in making up the federal budget this year, for which of 
the following programs would you like to see spending DECREASED and for which 
would you like to see spending INCREASED? How about federal spending on national 
GHIHQVHµSRLQWVFDOHUDQJLQJIURP´,QFUHDVHGDORWµWR´'HFUHDVHGDORWµ 
  
Independent Variables 
 
Self-transcendence 
(alpha = .77, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RW OLNHPHµ´$
OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVHSURQRXQVWKDW
PDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV  
a. 8QLYHUVDOLVP´ 6KHWKLQNVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWKDW every person in the world should be treated 
HTXDOO\6KHEHOLHYHVHYHU\RQHVKRXOGKDYHHTXDORSSRUWXQLWLHVLQOLIHµ    
b. 8QLYHUVDOLVP´6KHZDQWVHYHU\RQHWREHWUHDWHGMXVWO\HYHQSHRSOHVKHGRHVQ·WNQRZ,W
is important to her to protect the weak in sRFLHW\µ 
c. %HQHYROHQFH´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHOR\DOWRKHUIULHQGV6KHZDQWVWRGHYRWH
KLPVHOIWRSHRSOHFORVHWRKHUµ    
d. %HQHYROHQFH´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRUHVSRQGWRWKHQHHGVRIRWKHUV6KHWULHVWR
VXSSRUWWKRVHVKHNQRZVµ 
 
Openness to change 
(alpha = .67, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RWOLNHPHµ´$
OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVHSURQRXQVWKDW
PDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV  
a. Self-GLUHFWLRQ´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRPDNHKLVRZQGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKDWVKHGRHV 
6KHOLNHVWREHIUHHDQGQRWGHSHQGRQRWKHUVµ 
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b. Self-GLUHFWLRQ´ 7KLQNLQJXSQHZLGHDVDQGEHLQJFUHDWLYHLVLPSortant to her. She likes to 
GRWKLQJVLQKHURZQRULJLQDOZD\µ  
c. 6WLPXODWLRQ´6KHOLNHVWRWDNHULVNV6KHLVDOZD\VORRNLQJIRUDGYHQWXUHVµ  
d. 6WLPXODWLRQ´6KHOLNHVVXUSULVHV,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRKDYHDQH[FLWLQJOLIHµ 
 
Self-enhancement 
 (alpha = .84, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RWOLNHPHµ´$
OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVHSURQRXQVWKDW
PDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV  
a. Achievement ´6KHWKLQNVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWREHDPELWLRXV6KHZDQWVWRVKRZKRZ
FDSDEOHVKHLVµ  
b. Achievement ´*HWWLQJDKHDGLQOLIHLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHU6KHVWULYHVWRGREHWWHUWKDQ
RWKHUVµ 
c. $FKLHYHPHQW´ %eing very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognize 
her DFKLHYHPHQWVµ  
d. 3RZHU´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRJHWUHVSHFWIURPRWKHUV6KHZDQWVSHRSOHWRGRZKDW
VKHVD\Vµ   
e. Power ´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHLQFKDUJHDQGWHOORWKHUVZKDWWRGR6KHOLNHVWREH
WKHOHDGHUµ 
 
Conservation 
(alpha = .77, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RWOLNHPHµ´$
OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVHSURQRXQVWKDW
PDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV  
a. 6HFXULW\´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWROLYHLQVHFXUHVXUURXQGLQJV6KHDYRLGVDQ\WKLQJWKDW
might HQGDQJHUKHUVDIHW\µ    
b. 6HFXULW\´Having a stable society is important to her. She is concerned that the social 
RUGHUEHSURWHFWHGµ 
c. &RQIRUPLW\´6KHEHOLHYHVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGGRZKDWWKH\
UHWROG6KHWKLQNVSHRSOH
should follow rules at all timesHYHQZKHQQRRQHLVZDWFKLQJµ  
d. &RQIRUPLW\´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHREHGLHQWShe believes she should always show 
UHVSHFWWRKHUSDUHQWVDQGWRROGHUSHRSOHµ 
e. 7UDGLWLRQ´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHKXPEOHDQGPRGHVW6KHWULHVQRWWRGUDZ
attHQWLRQWRKHUVHOIµ   
f. 7UDGLWLRQ´7UDGLWLRQLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHU6KHWULHVWRIROORZWKHFXVWRPVKDQGHGGRZQ
E\KHUUHOLJLRQRUKHUIDPLO\µ 
 
High education:  
0 = less than four years of college 
1 = four years college degree or more 
 
Low income 
0 = more than $10,000 per year 
 OHVVSHU\HDURUGRQ·WNQRZ 
 
High income 
0 = Not more than $25,000 per year 
1 = More than $25,000 per year 
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Party identification 
o Strong Democrat (0) 
o Not very strong Democrat 
o Lean Democrat 
o Independent 
o Lean Republican 
o Not very strong Republican 
o Strong Republican (1) 
 
Black 
  0 = Non-Black respondents 
 1 = Black respondents 
 
Hispanic 
 0 = Non-Hispanic respondents 
 1 = Hispanic respondents 
 
Female 
 0 = Male respondents 
 1 = Female respondents 
 
 
General Social Survey Data (2012) 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Symbolic conservatism (single item rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more conservative 
preferences) 
a. ´:HKHDUDORWRIWDONWKHVHGD\VDERXWOLEHUDOVDQGFRQVHUYDWLYHV,
PJRLQJWRVKRZ\RXD
seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal--point 1--to extremely conservative--point 7. Where would you place 
\RXUVHOIRQWKLVVFDOH"µ   
 
Economic conservatism (alpha = .78, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences. GSS variable name in all caps.) 
a. HELPSICK: "Please look at the hand card. In general, some people think that it is the 
responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying 
for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of 
the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where 
would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?" "I 
STRONGLY AGREE IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT TO 
HELP" (0), "I AGREE WITH BOTH ANSWERS", "I STRONGLY AGREE THAT 
PEOPLE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES" (1) 
b. +(/3127´3OHDVHORRNDWWKHKDQGFDUG6RPHSHRSOHWKLQNWKDt the government in 
Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private 
businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve 
our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? "I 
STRONGLY AGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO MORE" (0), "I 
6 
AGREE WITH BOTH ANSWERS", "I STRONGLY AGREE THAT THE 
GOVERNMENT IS DOING TOO MUCH" (1) 
c. HELPPOOR: "I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. 
Please look at the hand card. Some people think that the government in Washington 
should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they 
are at Point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and 
that each person should take care of himself; they are at Point 5."I STRONGLY AGREE 
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMPROVE LIVING STANDARDS" (0), "I AGREE 
WITH BOTH ANSWERS", "I STRONGLY AGREE THAT PEOPLE SHOULD 
TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES" (1)  
d. EQWLTH: "Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the 
income differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy 
families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government 
should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the 
poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the 
government ought to reduce the income differences between rich and poor, and a score of 
7 meaning that the government should not concern itself with reducing income 
differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?" "Government 
should do something to reduce income differences between rich and poor" (0) 
"Government should not concern itself with income differences" (1) 
e. NATCHLD: "I would like to talk with you about some things people think about today. 
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or 
inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to 
tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about 
the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on 
assistance for childcare?" Three point scale "Too little" (0), "About right", and "Too much" 
(1).  
f. NATEDUC: "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on 
education?" Three point scale "Too little" (0), "About right", and "Too much" (1).  Some 
respondents received "Improving the nation's education system" instead of "education."  
 
Cultural conservatism (alpha = .69, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences. GSS variable name in all caps.) 
a. ABNOMORE: [In what circumstances should abortion be permitted] "If she is married 
and does not want any more children?" "Yes" "No" 
b. ABRAPE: [In what circumstances should abortion be permitted] "If she is married and 
does not want any more children?" "Yes" "No" 
c. HOMOSEX: "What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex-- do you 
think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?" 
d. PORNLAW: "Which of these statements comes closest to your feelings about 
pornography laws? 1. There should be laws against the distribution of pornography, 
whatever the age, or 2. There should be laws against the distribution of pornography to 
persons under 18, or 3. There should be no laws forbidding the distribution of 
pornography" 
 
Political Tolerance (alpha = 0.79, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences. GSS variable name in all caps.) 
a. SPKATH: "There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by 
other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion.  If such a 
7 
person wanted to make a speech in your (city/town/community) against churches and 
religion, should he be allowed to speak, or not?" "Yes, allowed" (0) "Not allowed" (1) 
b. SPKRAC: "Or, consider a person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior. If such 
a person wanted to make a speech in your community claiming that Blacks are inferior, 
should he be allowed to speak, or not?"  "Yes, allowed" "Not allowed" 
c. SPKCOM: "Now, I would like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a 
Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your 
community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?" "Yes, allowed" "Not allowed" 
d. SPKMIL: "Consider a person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the 
military run the country. If such a person wanted to make a speech in your community, 
should he be allowed to speak, or not?" "Yes, allowed" "Not allowed" 
e. SPKHOMO: "And what about a man who admits that he is homosexual. Suppose this 
admitted homosexual wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed 
to speak, or not?" "Yes, allowed" "Not allowed" 
 
Racial Conservatism (alpha = .72, all items rescaled 0-1 and coded so that higher values reflect more 
conservative preferences. GSS variable name in all caps.) 
a. NATRACEY/NATRACE: "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right 
amount on assistance to Blacks?" (Three point scale "Too little", "About right", and "Too 
much"). Some respondents received "Improving the conditions of Blacks" instead of 
"assistance to blacks."  
b. AFIRM1: "Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given 
preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and 
promotion of Blacks is wrong because it discriminates against Whites. What about your 
opinion -- are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?" [Branching 
follow-XSLI´IRUµSUHIHUHQFHV@´'R\RXIDYRUSUHIHUHQFHVLQKLULQJDQGSURPRWLRQ
VWURQJO\RUQRWVWURQJO\"µ>%UDQFKLQJIROORZ-XSLI´DJDLQVWµSUHIHUHQFHV@´'R\RX
RSSRVHSUHIHUHQFHVLQKLULQJDQGSURPRWLRQVWURQJO\RUQRWVWURQJO\"µ  
c. WRKWYUP: "Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree 
somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement. Irish, Italians, Jewish and 
many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the 
same without special favors."  
d. HLPBLK: "Please look at the hand card. Some people think that 
(Blacks/African-Americans) have been discriminated against for so long that the 
government has a special obligation to help improve their living standards. Others believe 
that the government should not be giving special treatment to 
(Blacks/African-Americans). Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you 
made up your mind on this?" "I STRONGLY AGREE THE GOVERNMENT IS 
OBLIGATED TO HELP BLACKS" (0), "I AGREE WITH BOTH ANSWERS", "I 
STRONGLY AGREE THAT PEOPLE SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES" 
(1) 
 
Hawk-Dove 
a. NATARMSY/NATARMS: "Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right 
amount on national defense?" (Three point scale "Too little", "About right", and "Too 
much"). Some respondents received "the military, armaments and defense" instead of 
"national defense."  
 
Independent Variables 
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Self-transcendence (alpha = .65, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RW
OLNHPHµ´$OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVH
SURQRXQVWKDWPDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOH
respondents. GSS variable name is in all caps in parentheses.)  
a. Universalism 1 (V$/(4/´6KHWKLQNVLWLVLPSRUWDQWWKDWHYHU\SHUVRQLQWKHZRUOG
VKRXOGEHWUHDWHGHTXDOO\6KHEHOLHYHVHYHU\RQHVKRXOGKDYHHTXDORSSRUWXQLWLHVLQOLIHµ  
b. 8QLYHUVDOLVP9$//,67´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWROLVWHQWRSHRSOHZKRDUHGLIIHUHQW
from her. (YHQZKHQVKHGLVDJUHHVZLWKWKHPVKHVWLOOZDQWVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHPµ  
c. 8QLYHUVDOLVP9$/(&2´6KHVWURQJO\EHOLHYHVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGFDUHIRUQDWXUH
/RRNLQJDIWHUWKHHQYLURQPHQWLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUµ  
d. %HQHYROHQFH9$/&$5(´ ,W
VYHU\LPSRUWDQW to her to help the people around her. She 
wants to care for their well-EHLQJµ  
e. %HQHYROHQFH9$/'927´ ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHOR\DOWRKHUIULHQGV6KHZDQWVWR
GHYRWHKHUVHOIWRSHRSOHFORVHWRKHUµ 
 
Openness to change (alpha = .62, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´ 1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´ 1RW
OLNHPHµ´$OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVH
SURQRXQVWKDWPDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOH
respondents. GSS variable name is in all caps in parentheses.)  
a. Self-GLUHFWLRQ9$/25,*´ ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRPDNHKHURZQdecisions about what 
she does. 6KHOLNHVWREHIUHHDQGQRWGHSHQGRQRWKHUVµ 
b. Self-direction 2 (9$/)5((´ ,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRPDNHKHURZQGHFLVLRQVDERXWZKDW
VKHGRHV6KHOLNHVWREHIUHHDQGQRWGHSHQGRQRWKHUVµ  
c. 6WLPXODWLRQ9$/',))´6KHOLNHVVXUSULVHVDQGLVDOZD\VORRNLQJIRUQHZWKLQJVWRGR
She thinks it is important to do lotVRIGLIIHUHQWWKLQJVLQOLIHµ  
d. 6WLPXODWLRQ9$/5,6.´6KHORRNVIRUDGYHQWXUHVDQGOLNHVWRWDNHULVNV6KHZDQWVWR
KDYHDQH[FLWLQJOLIHµ 
 
Self-enhancement (alpha = .70, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RW
lLNHPHµ´$OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVH
SURQRXQVWKDWPDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOH
respondents. GSS variable name is in all caps in parentheses.)  
a. PRZHU9$/5,&+  ´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHULFK6KHZDQWVWRKDYHDORWRIPRQH\
DQGH[SHQVLYHWKLQJVµ  
b. 3RZHU9$/5637´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWRJHWUHVSHFWIURPRWKHUV6KHZDQWVSHRSOH
WRGRZKDWVKHVD\Vµ  
c. $FKLHYHPHQW9$/$%/(´,W
VLPportant to her to show her abilities. She wants people 
WRDGPLUHZKDWVKHGRHVµ  
d. $FKLHYHPHQW9$/$&+9´ %HLQJYHU\VXFFHVVIXOLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHU6KHKRSHVSHRSOH
ZLOOUHFRJQL]HKHUDFKLHYHPHQWVµ 
 
Conservation (alpha = .73, all items scaled 0-1 from the following scale ´1RWOLNHPHDWDOOµ>@´1RWOLNH
PHµ´$OLWWOHOLNHPHµ´6RPHZKDWOLNHPHµ´/LNHPHµ´9HU\PXFKOLNHPHµ>@$OOLWHPVXVH
SURQRXQVWKDWPDWFKVH[RIWKHUHVSRQGHQWHJ´KHµIRUPDOHUHVSRQGHQWV´VKHµIRUIHPDOH
respondents. GSS variable name is in all in parentheses.)   
a. 6HFXULW\9$/6$)(´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWROLYHLQVHFXUHVXUURXQGLQJV6KHDYRLGV
DQ\WKLQJWKDWPLJKWHQGDQJHUKHUVDIHW\µ  
b. 6HFXULW\9$/')1'´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWHQVXUHVKHUsafety 
9 
DJDLQVWDOOWKUHDWV6KHZDQWVWKHVWDWHWREHVWURQJVRLWFDQGHIHQGLWVFLWL]HQVµ  
c. &RQIRUPLW\9$/58/(´6KHEHOLHYHVWKDWSHRSOHVKRXOGGRZKDWWKH\
UHWROG6KH
thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-RQHLVZDWFKLQJµ 
d. &RQIRUPLW\9$/3535´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUDOZD\VWREHKDYHSURSHUO\6KHZDQWVWR
DYRLGGRLQJDQ\WKLQJSHRSOHZRXOGVD\LVZURQJµ  
e. 7UDGLWLRQ9$/02'´,WLVLPSRUWDQWWRKHUWREHKXPEOHDQGPRGHVW6KHWULHVQRWWR
GUDZDWWHQWLRQWRKHUVHOIµ  
f. Tradition 2: (VALTRDN): Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs 
handed down by her religion or her family. 
 
High education:  
0 = less than four years of college 
1 = four years college degree or more 
 
Low income 
0 = more than $10,000 per year 
 OHVVSHU\HDURUGRQ·WNQRZ 
 
High income 
0 = Not more than $25,000 per year 
1 = More than $25,000 per year 
 
Party identification 
o Strong Democrat (0) 
o Not very strong Democrat 
o Lean Democrat 
o Independent 
o Lean Republican 
o Not very strong Republican 
o Strong Republican (1) 
 
Black 
  0 = Non-Black respondents 
 1 = Black respondents 
 
Hispanic 
 0 = Non-Hispanic respondents 
 1 = Hispanic respondents 
 
Female 
 0 = Male respondents 
 1 = Female respondents 
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Appendix A2: Description of Sampling Procedures and Treatment of Missing Data 
 
YouGov 2011 Data 
As part of the YouGov panel, respondents are surveyed on a variety of topics, mostly to aid 
corporate clients in market research on popular products. The text utilized to introduce potential 
respondents to the survey in our study is similar to text respondents receive when they answer surveys 
IRUWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ·VFRUSRUDWHFOLHQWV Respondents are notified initially via e-mail that there is a 
survey waiting for them. A link takes them to a page where they are notified of whether the survey 
FRPSHQVDWHVWKHPZLWKHQWULHVLQWRD´SUL]HGUDZµRUSRLQWVWKDWFDQEHWUDGHGIRUFDVKZKHQWKH\
complete enough surveys. The topic of the survey is not revealed before the respondent clicks the 
arrow to begin the survey. 
Respondents to the YouGov survey are drawn via matched quota sampling from a 
non-probability sample of over one million volunteer panelists. YouGov obtained a representative 
sample via a multistage process: first drawing a target sample from a high quality probability survey³in 
this instance the 2006 American Community Survey (ACS)³and then matching YouGov panelists to 
this target sample based upon marginal demographic and political characteristics obtained on the 
ACS. Over representation of certain subgroups and underrepresentation of others required 1,301 
FRPSOHWHGLQWHUYLHZVWREH´PDWFKHGGRZQµWRWKHWKDWIRUPHGRXUGDWDVHW The variables 
utilized in the matching procedure include gender, age, race, education, party identification, and 
political interest. 7KHPHWKRGRORJ\IRU<RX*RY·VSURFHGXUHVLVGHVFULEHGLQVavreck and Rivers 
(2008). Ansolabehere and Schaffner (N.d.) report the high comparability of estimates utilizing this 
method to those obtained utilizing standard nationally representative RDD telephone interviewing. 
Regarding missing data we note that nonresponse was rare, not exceeding 5% of those 
interviewed for any of the items in the Schwartz battery or in any of the policy scales we created. For 
the confirmatory factor analyses, WKH´ SDLUZLVHSUHVHQWµPHWKRGRIUHFRYHULQJPLVVLQJRbservations, as 
implemented in Mplus v.7.3 for the WLSMV estimator, is employed. Over 95% of each element of the 
asymptotic variance-covariance matrix for each group is observed. For the multivariate analyses 
utilizing the indices, the mean of the items the respondent answered is computed, provided the 
respondent answered half or more of the questions contained on the sale. Where this did not occur, the 
case is dropped. As indicated in Table 4, in all multivariate analyses employing YouGov data, more 
than 90% of the cases were retained via this practice. 
 
GSS 2012 Data 
The GSS has recently changed over from a repeating, cross-section design to a combined 
repeating cross-section and panel-component design. The file we utilize incorporates this rolling panel 
design, with the 2008 GSS as the first in the panel. A sub-set of 2,000 respondents were selected for 
2010 and 2012 re-interviews. In addition, new cross-sectional respondents were added in 2010 and 
2012. We use the sample of 1,295 respondents interviewed in 2008 and re-interviewed in 2010 and 
2012. Because the Schwartz items that appeared on the 2012 wave were administered only to these 
1,295 respondents, we do not include any of the new cross-section respondents added after 2008. The 
AAPOR RR5 response rate for the 2012 cross-section is 71.4% and is similar to the RR5 of 70.4% 
obtained in 2008 and 70.3% obtained in 2010. Different subsamples randomly received the policy 
items employed in the estimates reported in Tables 6 and 7. This further reduced the available sample 
for these analyses. Once again, item nonresponse was rare, not exceeding 5% of those interviewed for 
any of the items in the Schwartz battery or in any of the policy scales we created. 
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Appendix B1: CFA Models IRU)DFWRU6WUXFWXUHYV)DFWRU´/LEHUDOµDQG´&RQVHUYDWLYHµ 
Structure 
    
We tested whether our preferred four-factor solution fits the data better than a more 
parsimonious two-factor solution whereby all of the self-transcendence and openness-to-change items 
listed in Tables 2-DUHFRQVWUDLQHGWRORDGRQDODWHQW´liberalµIDFWRUand the self-enhancement and 
FRQVHUYDWLRQYDOXHVDUHFRQVWUDLQHGWRORDGRQWRDODWHQW´conservativeµIactor. The model fit statistics 
appear below. A comparison of the four-factor and two-factor solutions reveals that our preferred 
four-factor model yields superior fit on every measure of model fit in both samples. A formal 
chi-square difference test reveals the same in both samples (p < .001).  
 
 
2011 YouGov survey 
 4 factors  
Schwartz values 
model 
2 factors 
Liberal & conservation values 
model 
Robust WLS F2 729.13 2929.97 
Degrees of freedom 125 130 
p-value < .01 < .01 
CFI  .95 .78 
RMSEA .06 .13 
 
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean 
square error of approximation. Number of observations = 1199. 
 
 
2012 GSS survey 
 4 factors  
Schwartz values 
model 
2 factors 
Liberal & conservation values 
model 
Robust WLS F2 443.23 1283.66 
Degrees of freedom 123 128 
p-value < .01 < .01 
CFI  .95 .81 
RMSEA .05 .08 
 
Notes: WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation. 
Number of observations = 1289. 
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Appendix B2: CFA Models for 2 Factor ´Self-transcendenceµ 	´Conservationµ Structure vs. 
1 Factor Structure 
  
Next, we estimated CFA models using only the self-transcendence and conservation items. We 
wanted to assess whether a two-factor specification EDVHGRQ6FKZDUW]·VWKHRU\ILW the data better than 
a one-factor model in which all items would be dependent on a single latent factor. We found that the 
two factor model provides superior fit to the one-factor alternative. A formal chi-square difference test 
reveals the same in both the YouGov and GSS samples (p < .001). 
 
 
2011 YouGov survey 
 2 factor self-transcendence & 
conservation  
model 
1  
factor 
model 
Robust WLS F2 166.6 605.5 
Degrees of freedom 27 28 
p-value < .01 < .01 
CFI  .98 .91 
RMSEA .07 .13 
 
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean 
square error of approximation. Number of observations = 1199. 
 
 
2012 GSS survey 
 2 factor self-transcendence & 
conservation  
model 
1  
factor 
model 
Robust WLS F2 139.33 346.35 
Degrees of freedom 36 37 
p-value < .01 < .01 
CFI  0.97 0.92 
RMSEA .05 .07 
 
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean 
square error of approximation. Number of observations = 1289. 
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Appendix B3: CFA Models for 4 Factor Structure vs. 2 Factor ´6HOI-transcendence / 
Self-HQKDQFHPHQWµ	´&RQVHUYDWLRQ2SHQQHVVµ6WUXFWXUH  
 
Here we test whether our preferred four-factor solution fits the data better than a more 
parsimonious two-factor solution whereby all of the self-transcendence and self-enhancement items 
listed in Tables 2-3 are constrained to load on one latent factor while the openness and conservation 
values are constrained to load onto a second latent factor. We report the model fit statistics below. A 
comparison of the four-factor and two-factor solutions reveals that our preferred four-factor model 
yields superior fit on every measure of model fit in both samples. A formal chi-square difference test 
reveals the same in both samples (p < .001).  
 
 
2011 YouGov survey 
 4 factor  
model 
2 factor 
model 
Robust WLS F2 729.13 3074.27 
Degrees of freedom 125 132 
p-value < .01 < 0.01 
CFI  .95 0.76 
RMSEA .06 0.14 
 
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean 
square error of approximation. Number of observations = 1199. 
  
 
2012 GSS survey 
 4 factor  
model 
2 factor 
model 
Robust WLS F2 443.23 1283.65 
Degrees of freedom 123 128 
p-value < .01 < .01 
CFI  .95 0.81 
RMSEA .05 0.08 
 
Notes: Estimates based on raw data. WLS = weighted least squares. CFI = comparative fit index. RMSEA = root mean 
square error of approximation. Number of observations = 1289. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
Appendix C1: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic 
Ideology and Policy Opinions, 2011 YouGov Survey  
 
  
          
Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
welfare 
Racial 
issues 
Cultural 
issues 
Hawk- 
dove issues 
Uni- 
lateralism 
Constant 0.23* 0.42* 0.40* 0.09* 0.32* 0.36* 
 (5.29) (12.42) (6.28) (2.01) (9.76) (6.76) 
Black 0.07* -0.01 -0.06 0.14* -0.00 0.02 
 (2.99) (-0.50) (-1.91) (6.28) (-0.05) (0.74) 
Hispanic 0.01 -0.04* -0.18* 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
 (0.46) (-2.42) (-5.29) (1.70) (-0.87) (-1.67) 
Female -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04* 
 (-1.79) (-1.81) (0.77) (-1.13) (-1.31) (-2.13) 
Age (in years) 0.002* 0.001* 0.004* 0.003* 0.002* 0.003* 
 (4.82) (2.88) (5.89) (6.21) (4.68) (4.51) 
High education -0.02 -0.02 -0.09* -0.04* -0.03* -0.02 
 (-1.41) (-1.73) (-4.54) (-2.58) (-3.07) (-0.99) 
Low income 0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.05 
 (0.44) (-1.70) (0.52) (-0.15) (-1.08) (-1.62) 
High income 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (1.73) (0.78) (-0.45) (-0.78) (0.54) (0.68) 
Party identification  0.47* 0.32* 0.21* 0.30* 0.19* 0.27* 
 (24.25) (19.79) (7.71) (15.09) (12.61) (11.12) 
Self-transcendence -0.28* -0.36* -0.26* -0.35* -0.30* -0.31* 
 (-6.63) (-9.53) (-4.53) (-7.36) (-8.42) (-5.92) 
Conservation  0.37* 0.14* 0.38* 0.58* 0.25* 0.22* 
 (9.02) (4.04) (6.55) (13.24) (7.09) (4.10-) 
Self-enhancement -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.07* 0.02 
 (-1.22) (1.68) (0.59) (0.13) (2.19) (0.38) 
Openness-to-change -0.02 0.07* 0.05 0.01 0.12* 0.06 
 (-0.52) (2.01) (0.79) (0.13) (3.48) (1.01) 
       
Adj. R2  .52 .44 .23 .41 .33 .22 
Root mean square 
error 
.20 .17 .28 .21 .16 .26 
Fk, n-k-1  115.92 86.92 32.04 81.17 44.85 28.02 
F p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Number of cases 1102 1104 1094 1104 1103 1089 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in parentheses. All 
variables lie on a 0-1 range.   
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Appendix C2: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic 
Ideology and Policy Opinions, 2012 GSS 
 
  
          
Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
issues 
Racial  
issues 
Cultural  
issues 
Civil liberty 
issues 
Hawk- 
dove issues 
Constant 0.34* 0.30* 0.55* 0.21* 0.14 0.16 
 (6.50) (5.18) (7.89) (2.15) (1.38) (1.50) 
Black 0.08* -0.04 -0.25* 0.11* -0.02 0.07 
 (3.51) (-1.75) (-8.98) (2.84) (-0.54) (1.67) 
Hispanic 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.21* 0.06 -0.05 
 (0.53) (-0.83) (-0.53) (3.52) (0.78) (-0.75) 
Female 0.01 -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.03 0.04 
 (0.58) (-0.70) (-2.50) (-0.36) (1.32) (1.72) 
Age (in years) 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 
 (1.93) (4.43) (1.58) (2.17) (1.18) (3.16) 
High education -0.00 0.03 -0.04* -0.10* -0.09* -0.08 
 (-0.26) (1.72) (-2.05) (-3.46) (-4.71) (-2.94)* 
Low income -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.01 
 (-1.79) (-0.41) (0.24) (-1.13) (0.34) (0.30) 
High income -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.13* -0.14* 0.02 
 (-1.47) (1.18) (0.80) (-3.54) (-3.01) (0.65) 
Party identification  0.37* 0.29* 0.16* 0.31* -0.03 0.31* 
 (16.83) (13.14) (5.54) (7.62) (-0.83) (8.04) 
Self-transcendence -0.19* -0.21* -0.17* 0.04 -0.21* -0.31* 
 (-3.10) (-2.94) (-2.14) (0.36) (-1.96) (-2.67) 
Conservation  0.32* -0.02 0.24* 0.38* 0.45* 0.33* 
 (6.84) (-0.29) (3.97) (4.39) (5.55) (3.90) 
Self-enhancement -0.12* -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 
 (-2.87) (-1.17) (-0.18) (-0.98) (-0.25) (-0.13) 
Openness-to-change -0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.20* 0.04 0.07 
 (-0.44) (1.96) (0.36) (-2.45) (0.52) (0.76) 
       
Adj. R2 .34 .31 .26 .24 .18 .12 
Root mean square 
error 
.19 .18 .21 .29 .27 .36 
Fk, n-k-1 
 45.57 25.22 19.21 24.93 11.10 14.84 
Number of cases 1202 817 749 770 821 1202 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed) 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates for all models. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. All variables lie on a 0-1 range.  
Source: 2012 GSS. 
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Appendix D: Is it really the Case that Personally-Focused Values do Not Matter? 
  
We have argued that socially-focused values (i.e., self-transcendence and conservation) drive public opinion to a much greater extent than 
personally-focused values (i.e., self-enhancement and openness). The OLS estimates reported in Tables 4 and 6 support this view. Across the 12 
models, self-transcendence significantly affects the dependent variable 11 times with a mean coefficient of -0.24; conservation is significant in 11 
of 12 models with a mean coefficient of .30; self-enhancement is significant in 2 of 12 models with a mean coefficient of -0.01; and openness is 
significant in 3 of 12 models with a mean coefficient of .02. We have interpreted these results as evidence that the personally-focused values do 
not systematically impact symbolic ideology and policy positions on a range of disparate issues. An alternative explanation for this pattern of 
results is that high multicollinearity among the four value scales prevents self-enhancement and openness from reaching statistical significance in 
the models. To establish that multicollinearity is not responsible for the results we obtained, we report the variance-inflation-factors for each 
value variable in each model in the table below. Some scholars indicate that a VIF > 5.00 represents cause for concern (Menard 1995: 66); others 
say a VIF > 10.00 represents high multicollinearity (Kennedy 2008: 199). As the VIF values indicate, multicollinearity among the values measures 
falls well below the typical rule-of-thumb thresholds. We also point out that the average magnitude of the personally-focused values 
(self-enhancement = -0.01 and openness-to-change = .02) are substantively trivial. Hence, even if multicollinearity augments the size of the 
standard errors to some degree, the effects of the two personally-focused values on public opinion are sufficiently small to conclude that they do 
not have much substantive impact. 
 
Variance-inflation-factor (VIF) for Each Value Predictor in Each Model 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
welfare 
Racial 
issues 
Cultural 
issues 
Hawk-dove 
issues 
 
Unilateralism 
Mean  
VIF 
2011 YouGov Data:        
  Self-transcendence 1.45 1.45 1.44 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 
  Conservation 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 
  Self-enhancement 1.68 1.68 1.67 1.67 1.68 1.68 1.68 
  Openness-to-change 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.54 1.55 1.54 
        
 Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
welfare 
Racial 
issues 
Cultural 
issues 
Civil  
liberties 
Hawk-dove 
issues 
Mean  
VIF 
2012 GSS Data:        
  Self-transcendence 1.53 1.50 1.57 1.50 1.53 1.53 1.53 
  Conservation 1.47 1.45 1.51 1.51 1.52 1.50 1.49 
  Self-enhancement 1.36 1.32 1.34 1.50 1.46 1.35 1.39 
  Openness-to-change 1.43 1.39 1.47 1.49 1.48 1.43 1.45 
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   To further underscore the limited influence of the personally-focused value, we estimated a series of models that included the 
self-enhancement and openness-to-change predictors of public opinion, but dropped self-transcendence and conservation. If the 
self-enhancement and openness value dimensions matter for public opinion, each predictor should manifest consistent effects across the models. 
However, as we see in the OLS tables below, neither variable performs well under this favorable model specification. The first table reports the 
YouGov results, while the second contains the GSS estimates. The self-enhancement variable is significant in 4 of 12 models with a mean OLS 
coefficient of 0.06. Hence, self-enhancement does better as compared to the models that include the sociotropic value scales (see Tables 4 and 6 
in the text), in which it was significant in 2 of 12 tests and had a mean coefficient of -0.01. Nevertheless, the 0.06 coefficient is substantively small 
in absolute terms and compared to the mean effect sizes of self-transcendence (-0.24) and conservation (0.30) as reported in the fully specified 
models in Tables 4 and 6. Turning to openness values, we see that it performs even worse. In models lacking the two socially-focused values, 
openness attains significance in 3 of 12 tests and manifests an average coefficient of -0.05. This level of performance differs little from what we 
observed in the fully specified models in Tables 4 and 6 where openness reaches significance in 3 of 12 models with an average coefficient of 0.02.  
 
OLS Estimates of the Effects of Human Values on Symbolic Conservatism and Policy Opinions when Socially-focused Values are 
excluded from the Model, 2011 YouGov Survey 
 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
issues 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
  
Unilateralism 
Self-enhancement 0.05  0.08  0.13  0.17  0.13  0.07 
     (1.42)  (2.39)  (2.57)  (4.15)  (4.50)  (1.45) 
            
Openness-to-change -0.11  -0.03  -0.03  -0.10  0.03  -0.02 
 (-2.37)  (-0.72)  (-0.53)  (-2.16)  (0.96)  (-0.39) 
            
Adjusted R2 .48  .39  .20  .31  .26  .20 
RMSE .20  .17  .29  .23  .16  .27 
            
Number of cases 1115  1116  1106  1117  1116  1102 
    
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The shaded areas are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model 
estimates include the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls. We exclude these to save space. RMSE = root mean square error. 
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OLS Estimates of the Effects of Human Values on Symbolic Conservatism and Policy Opinions when Socially-focused Values are 
excluded from the Model, 2012 GSS Survey 
 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
issues 
 Civil  
liberties 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
Self-enhancement -0.05  -0.05  0.03  0.02  0.08  0.05 
     (-1.31)  (-1.34)  (0.63)  (0.24)  (1.14)  (0.78) 
            
Openness-to-change -0.07  0.03  -0.02  -0.19  -0.03  -0.02 
 (-1.84)  (0.64)  (-0.43)  (-2.73)  (-0.45)  (-0.29) 
            
Adjusted R2 .31  .30  .24  .21  .13  .10 
RMSE .20  .18  .21  .29  .28  .36 
            
Number of cases 1202  817  749  770  821  1202 
 
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The shaded areas are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model 
estimates include the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls. We exclude these to save space. RMSE = root mean square error. 
 
As a final test, we follow the centering procedure that Schwartz sometimes recommends by standardizing the value items. We calculated the mean 
rating across all value items for each subject individually, and then calculated individual-specific mean-deviations for all value items. In other 
words, we take each respondents score on a given value item and subtract their mean value score across all the value items from it to get a 
´FHQWHUHGµPHDVXUH. Next, we regressed each issue variable on the centered value scales and the controls. We found that the self-transcendence 
values continue to perform as predicted, reaching significance in 7 of 12 models and approaching significance in 3 additional models. Next, 
conservation reaches significance in 4 of 12 models and approaches significance in an additional model. Finally, self-enhancement and openness 
continue to perform poorly: Self-enhancement reaches significance in a single model and Openness fails to do so in any of the twelve 
re-estimations. The null findings suggest, once again, that the personally-focused values may not have much influence on public opinion. The 
weaker conservation results are a bit troubling as well, but we think the reason the conservation variable turns in a subpar performance is because 
of severe multicollinearity. Averaging across all 12 models, the mean variance-inflation-factor (VIF) for conservation equals 13.56 in the YouGov 
data and 5.35 in the GSS data, (recall that econometricians view VIF > 5.00 or > 10.00 as problematic). Moreover, the VIFs are high for our other 
centered-values measures (ranging from 2.70 to 12.07). For this reason, we favor the estimates for the un-centered values measures, which suffer 
from relatively little multicollinearity (as indicated above, the VIF range from 1.32 to 1.68). 
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Appendix E1: Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic Ideology and Policy Opinions, 2011 YouGov 
Survey 
 
Low education respondents (non-college degree) 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
issues 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
  
Unilateralism 
Self-transcendence -0.22  -0.32  -0.23  -0.33  -0.27  -0.26 
 (-4.53)  (-7.38)  (-3.52)  (-6.03)  (-6.55)  (-4.26) 
            
Conservation 0.36  0.10  0.30  0.57  0.20  0.16 
 (6.91)  (2.43)  (4.12)  (10.28)  (4.70)  (2.28) 
            
Self-enhancement -0.06  0.05  0.03  -0.02  0.08  0.00 
     (-1.33)  (1.41)  (0.54)  (-0.48)  (2.18)  (0.03) 
            
Openness-to-change -0.06  0.09  0.06  0.04  0.13  0.14 
 (-1.08)  (1.84)  (0.78)  (0.73)  (3.15)  (1.99) 
            
Adjusted R2 .48  .38  .18  .35  .26  .17 
            
Number of cases 803  805  795  805  805  790 
 
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The shaded areas are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model 
estimates with the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls are omitted to preserve clarity. Self-transcendence should be negatively related to the dependent variables. 
Conservation values should be positively related to the dependent variables. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change should not systematically affect the dependent 
variables. 
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High education respondents (college degree) 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
Issues 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
  
Unilateralism 
Self-transcendence -0.50  -0.44  -0.29  -0.43  -0.39  -0.46 
 (-5.98)  (-6.56)  (-2.56)  (-4.41)  (-5.26)  (-4.82) 
            
Conservation 0.34  0.13  0.47  0.53  0.30  0.32 
 (5.54)  (2.21)  (4.98)  (7.58)  (4.68)  (3.39) 
            
Self-enhancement -0.01  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.02 
     (-0.22)  (0.77)  (0.29)  (0.66)  (0.33)  (0.25) 
            
Openness-to-change 0.11  0.07  0.08  -0.06  0.12  -0.13 
 (1.45)  (1.18)  (0.75)  (-0.63)  (1.95)  (-1.29) 
            
Adjusted R2 .66  .62  .34  .53  .48  .40 
            
Number of cases 299  299  299  299  298  299 
     
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The shaded areas are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model 
estimates with the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls are omitted to preserve clarity. Self-transcendence should be negatively related to the dependent variables. 
Conservation values should be positively related to the dependent variables. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change should not systematically affect the dependent 
variables.  
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Appendix E2: Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic Ideology and Policy Opinions, 2012 GSS Survey 
 
Low education respondents (non-college degree) 
 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
issues 
 Civil  
liberties 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
Self-transcendence -0.19  -0.13  -0.02  0.02  -0.31  -0.38 
 (-2.55)  (-1.37)  (-0.24)  (0.15)  (-2.06)  (-2.61) 
            
Conservation 0.30  -0.09  0.07  0.44  0.51  0.29 
 (5.43)  (-1.22)  (0.91)  (3.48)  (4.51)  (2.58) 
            
Self-enhancement -0.11  -0.04  0.02  0.02  -0.00  0.07 
     (-2.31)  (-0.86)  (0.41)  (0.20)  (-0.02)  (0.85) 
            
Openness-to-change 0.02  0.11  -0.04  -0.23  0.02  0.03 
 (0.40)  (2.04)  (-0.51)  (-2.10)  (0.17)  (0.29) 
            
Adjusted R2 .23  .26  .22  .16  .13  .07 
            
Number of cases 818  548  529  513  554  821 
    
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The shaded areas are statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model 
estimates with the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls are omitted to preserve clarity. Self-transcendence should be negatively related to the dependent variables. 
Conservation values should be positively related to the dependent variables. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change should not systematically affect the dependent 
variables. 
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High education respondents (college degree) 
 Symbolic 
ideology 
 Economic 
welfare issues 
 Racial 
issues 
 Cultural 
issues 
 Civil  
liberties 
 Hawk-dove 
issues 
Self-transcendence -0.10  -0.32  -0.44  0.04  -0.03  -0.08 
 (-1.11)  (-3.10)  (-2.88)  (0.21)  (-0.28)  (-0.42) 
            
Conservation 0.25  0.06  0.53  0.24  0.38  0.39 
 (3.21)  (0.77)  (5.70)  (2.02)  (4.50)  (2.99) 
            
Self-enhancement -0.14  -0.06  -0.18  -0.26  -0.04  -0.20 
     (-1.88)  (-0.89)  (-2.13)  (-2.07)  (-0.58)  (-1.57) 
            
Openness-to-change -0.11  0.07  0.21    -0.18  0.11  0.16 
 (-1.67)  (0.78)  (1.97)  (-1.58)  (1.26)  (1.20) 
            
Adjusted R2 .55  .43  .41  .31  .11  .21 
            
Number of cases 384  269  220  257  267  381 
    
 
Notes: All estimates are from OLS regressions. The t values appear in the parentheses. The third rows include the standardized regression coefficients. The shaded areas are 
statistically significant at p < .05 (two-tailed test). Full model estimates with the party, demographic, and socioeconomic controls are omitted to preserve clarity. 
Self-transcendence should be negatively related to the dependent variables. Conservation values should be positively related to the dependent variables. Self-enhancement and 
openness-to-change should not systematically affect the dependent variables. 
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Appendix F: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic 
Ideology and Policy Opinions (self-WUDQVFHQGHQFHZLWKRXW´HTXDORSSRUWXQLWLHVµLWHP, 
2012 GSS 
 
  
          
Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
issues 
Racial  
issues 
Cultural  
issues 
Civ Liberty 
issues 
Hawk-dov
e issues 
Constant 0.31* 0.26* 0.52* 0.22* 0.12 0.11 
 (6.23) (4.69) (7.82) (2.37) (1.22) (1.09) 
Black 0.08* -0.04 -0.25* 0.11* -0.02 0.07 
 (3.53) (-1.62) (-8.91) (2.81) (-0.57) (1.67) 
Hispanic 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.21* 0.07 -0.04 
 (0.63) (-0.60) (-0.51) (3.49) (0.83) (-0.64) 
Female 0.01 -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 0.03 0.04 
 (0.53) (-0.79) (-2.50) (-0.37) (1.38) (1.71) 
Age (in years) 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.003* 
 (1.97) (4.43) (1.60) (2.14) (1.30) (3.27) 
High education -0.00 0.03 -0.04* -0.09* -0.09* -0.08* 
 (-0.34) (1.65) (-2.15) (-3.43) (-4.76) (-3.02) 
Low income -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.02 
 (-1.73) (-0.34) (0.25) (-1.14) (0.37) (0.34) 
High income -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.13* -0.13* 0.02 
 (-1.47) (1.19) (0.77) (-3.53) (-3.03) (0.65) 
Party identification  0.37* 0.30* 0.17* 0.31* -0.03 0.31* 
 (17.02) (13.53) (5.63) (7.67) (-0.74) (8.28) 
Self-transcendence -0.11* -0.11* -0.09 0.01 -0.16* -0.19* 
 (-2.52) (-2.39) (-1.50) (0.11) (-2.05) (-2.16) 
Conservation  0.31* -0.04 0.22* 0.39* 0.44* 0.31* 
 (6.70) (-0.69) (3.72) (4.55) (5.81) (3.66) 
Self-enhancement -0.11* -0.04 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.00 
 (-2.73) (-0.96) (-0.06) (-1.02) (-0.21) (0.00) 
Openness-to-change -0.03 0.07 0.00 -0.19* 0.04 0.05 
 (-0.77) (1.52) (0.08) (-2.37) (0.53) (0.57) 
       
Adj. R2 .34 .31 .25 .24 .18 .12 
Root mean square 
error 
.19 .18 .21 .29 .27 .36 
Fk, n-k-1 
 44.43 23.52 19.19 24.85 11.31 14.37 
F p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Number of cases 1201 816 749 769 820 1201 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed) 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. All variables lie on a 0-1 range.    
Source: 2012 GSS survey. 
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Appendix G: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values on Symbolic 
Ideology and Policy Opinions (controlling for authoritarianism), 2012 GSS 
 
  
          
Symbolic 
ideology 
Economic 
issues 
Racial  
issues 
Cultural  
issues 
Civ Liberty 
issues 
Hawk- 
dove issues 
Constant 0.37* 0.32* 0.64* 0.18* 0.04 0.33* 
 (6.44) (5.36) (6.70) (1.41) (0.27) (2.70) 
Black 0.08* -0.03 -0.23* 0.07 -0.01 0.05 
 (3.00) (-1.54) (-5.04) (1.50) (-0.20) (0.95) 
Hispanic -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.15* -0.01 -0.05 
 (-0.30) (-0.68) (-0.44) (1.98) (-0.08) (-0.57) 
Female -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
 (-0.34) (-0.68) (-1.29) (0.44) (1.11) (0.96) 
Age (in years) 0.001* 0.002* 0.001 0.003* 0.002 0.002* 
 (2.32) (4.36) (1.65) (2.87) (1.53) (2.23) 
High education 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.07* -0.07* 
 (1.13) (1.47) (0.17) (-1.33) (-2.32) (-2.09) 
Low income -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 0.10 -0.00 
 (-1.19) (-0.55) (-0.17) (-0.72) (1.52) (-0.03) 
High income -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.10* -0.08 0.01 
 (-0.83) (1.04) (0.14) (-2.35) (-1.57) (0.27) 
Party identification  0.36* 0.30* 0.19* 0.20* -0.05 0.29* 
 (14.50) (13.26) (4.87) (4.62) (-1.13) (6.51) 
Authoritarianism 0.07* -0.04 -0.06 0.30* 0.21* 0.04 
 (2.16) (-1.25) (-1.21) (5.37) (3.31) (0.61) 
Self-transcendence -0.19* -0.21* -0.25* -0.13 -0.09 -0.37* 
 (-2.80) (-2.92) (-2.24) (-1.10) (-1.11) (-2.58) 
Conservation  0.23* -0.01 0.18* 0.36* 0.53* 0.36* 
 (4.32) (-0.16) (1.87) (3.72) (5.72) (3.46) 
Self-enhancement -0.09* -0.04 -0.02 -0.17* -0.09 -0.12 
 (-2.07) (-1.07) (-0.25) (-2.31) (-1.11) (-1.51) 
Openness-to-change -0.05 0.07 0.02 -0.02 0.15 -0.01 
 (-1.14) (1.65) (0.19) (-0.18) (1.65) (-0.13) 
Adj. R2 .34 .31 .25 .30 .24 .12 
Root mean square 
error 
.19 .18 .20 .25 .26 .36 
Fk, n-k-1
 27.06 23.08 7.70 18.08 11.20 10.62 
F p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Number of cases 805 808 392 412 420 796 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed) 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. All variables lie on a 0-1 range.    
Source: 2012 GSS survey. 
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Appendix H1: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values and Symbolic 
Ideology on Policy Opinions, 2011 YouGov Survey  
 
   
         
Economic 
issues 
Cultural 
issues 
Racial issues Hawk-dove 
issues 
 
Unilateralism  
Constant 0.46* 0.01 0.34* 0.27* 0.30* 
 (11.61) (0.20) (5.32) (8.43) (5.67) 
Black -0.03 0.11* -0.08* -0.01 -0.00 
 (-1.75) (5.47) (-2.37) (-0.97) (-0.05) 
Hispanic -0.05* 0.03 -0.18* -0.01 -0.05 
 (-2.94) (1.48) (-5.32) (-0.86) (-1.89) 
Female -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03* 
 (-1.34) (-0.53) (1.05) (-0.79) (-1.69) 
Age (in years) 0.0005 0.002* 0.003* 0.001* 0.002* 
 (1.34) (4.89) (5.17) (3.54) (3.41) 
High education -0.01 -0.03* -0.08* -0.03* -0.01 
 (-1.34) (-2.31) (-4.38) (-2.91) (-0.70) 
Low income -0.04* -0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 
 (-1.97) (-0.06) (0.48) (-1.32) (-1.85) 
High income 0.0002 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (-1.62) (-0.65) (0.12) (0.26) 
Party identification  0.18* 0.13* 0.10* 0.10* 0.14* 
 (10.32) (5.67) (2.78) (5.42) (4.45) 
Self-transcendence -0.28* -0.25* -0.20* -0.25* -0.23* 
 (-7.74) (-5.39) (-3.39) (-6.95) (-4.45) 
Openness-to-change 0.08* 0.02 0.05 0.13* 0.07 
 (2.47) (0.36) (0.87) (3.62) (1.15) 
Self-enhancement 0.06* 0.02 0.04 0.08* 0.03 
 (2.15) (0.63) (0.82) (2.63) (0.67) 
Conservation 0.03 0.45* 0.29* 0.18* 0.13* 
 (0.95) (10.27) (4.96) (5.42) (2.23) 
Symbolic ideology 0.28* 0.36* 0.23* 0.19* 0.29* 
 (10.64) (11.07) (4.60) (7.50) (6.55) 
      
Adj. R2  .50 .48 .22 .36 .26 
Root mean square error .16 .20 .28 .15 .26 
Fk, n-k-1  91.89 104.36 27.13 49.60 31.06 
F p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Number of observations 1099 1099 1094 1098 1089 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. All variables lie on a 0-1 range.   
Source: 2011 YouGov survey. 
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Appendix H2: Full Model Estimates of the Impact of Basic Human Values and Symbolic 
Ideology on Policy Opinions, 2012 GSS 
 
   
         
Economic 
issues 
Racial  
Issues 
Cultural  
issues 
Civil liberties 
issues 
Hawk-dove 
issues 
Constant 0.19* 0.47* 0.08 0.13 0.07 
 (3.42) (7.02) (0.76) (1.26) (0.65) 
Black -0.06* -0.26* 0.09* -0.02 0.06 
 (-2.59) (-9.37) (2.19) (-0.53) (1.29) 
Hispanic -0.03 -0.04 0.22* 0.07 -0.06 
 (-0.90) (-0.70) (3.31) (0.85) (-0.87) 
Female -0.01 -0.04* -0.02 0.03 0.04 
 (-0.45) (-2.42) (-0.74) (1.25) (1.67) 
Age (in years) 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* 
 (4.24) (1.15) (1.85) (1.36) (2.80) 
High education 0.03 -0.04* -0.08* -0.09* -0.08* 
 (1.75) (-2.01) (-2.93) (-4.54) (-2.80) 
Low income -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.02 
 (-0.43) (0.47) (-1.07) (0.04) (0.53) 
High income 0.03 0.04 -0.12* -0.15* 0.03 
 (1.47) (1.48) (-3.00) (-3.05) (0.83) 
Party identification  0.19* 0.07* 0.18* -0.04 0.21* 
 (7.52) (2.38) (3.79) (-0.71) (4.43) 
Self-transcendence -0.16* -0.12 0.08 -0.24* -0.25* 
 (-2.27) (-1.62) (0.66) (-2.22) (-2.11) 
Openness-to-change 0.10* 0.01 -0.16* 0.06 0.06 
 (2.44) (0.24) (-2.05) (0.83) (0.69) 
Self-enhancement -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (-0.76) (0.07) (-0.16) (0.07) (0.23) 
Conservation -0.08 0.17* 0.28* 0.43* 0.24* 
 (-1.54) (2.66) (3.07) (5.55) (2.72) 
Symbolic ideology 0.28* 0.24* 0.36* 0.03 0.27* 
 (8.19) (5.14) (5.62) (0.50) (4.13) 
      
Adj. R2  .38 .29 .28 .17 .14 
Root mean square error .17 .20 .28 .27 .36 
Fk, n-k-1  30.97 20.76 25.96 9.62 17.54 
F p value < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
Number of observations 800 731 753 800 1174 
 
* p < .05 (two-tailed). 
Notes: Ordinary least squares regression estimates. Unstandardized coefficients reported with t statistics in 
parentheses. All variables lie on a 0-1 range.   
Source: 2012 GSS. 
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